Sample: Analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the United States wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan

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Title: Analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the United States wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan

 

Introduction

Insurgency and counter-insurgency both constitute key elements of War. In the US wars in Vietnam and more lately, in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency was one of the main areas of focus for the US troops, both in training and in combat positions. Insurgency is an important aspect of war for Marine Corps in various military operations that they undertake in the course of their career.

By definition, insurgency is a variety of internal war, fought within a state, in which some elements of civil war are present. Insurgency entails various aspects that characterize a typical internal warfare, just like in the case of rebels who are a country’s residents, who resolve to throw out what they perceive to be governments propped up by foreign powers. In this case, the fighters mainly employ guerrilla-type attacks and terrorist tactics. Counter-insurgency, therefore, entails military action taken by the government in co-operation with the perceived foreign power, to counter the guerilla and terrorist activities of the rebels. Although every insurgency possesses its unique features, there are certain characteristics that are typical of all insurgencies. These struggles are normally protracted, the insurgency military forces normally perform a subsidiary role, guerilla tactics are normally employed, and the insurgent political infrastructure plays a critical role.

In Vietnam, the aim of the US Marine Corps was to counter the insurgency within that country. The marine strategy that was used in that country possessed numerous elements that are required for the facilitation of a counterinsurgency war. Some of the counterinsurgency tactics employed by the Marine Corps in Vietnam included county fair operations, combine action platoons, and Golden Fleece operations. A debate has been going on regarding whether the Marines used the right formula for defeating the Viet Cong. In this war, the US lost.

In Afghanistan, following the initial success in overthrowing the Taliban rule in 2001, the US and Afghan forces started encountering an increase in violent insurgency. The insurgents were comprised of the Taliban, the Haqqani, and Hezb-i-Islami, who formed a formidable network that incorporated local tribes, foreign fighters, and criminal groups. This network was engaged in violent efforts to try and overthrow the government that had replaced the Afghan regime. For analysts, the experiences of US, coalition forces, and the Afghan military presented a great opportunity for the analysis of what strategies work out and which one do not during insurgency and counterinsurgency wars.

The present paper focuses on three points. The first point entails detailed definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency from a theoretical perspective. The second point covers an analysis of players, strategy, tactics, and logistics of insurgency and counterinsurgency in both the US’s conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The third point entails comparing and contrasting previous analyses and providing insights into effectiveness on both sides of the two conflicts. The paper ends with a summary that recaps the issues covered in the paper. It also includes an assessment on whether the strategies that Marine Corps employed in the conflicts were the ideal ones. On the basis of this assessment, alternatives for insurgency and counterinsurgency tactics are offered and avenues for further research in this area highlighted.

Definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency from a theoretical perspective Fighting an insurgency has never been the same thing as a fight against terror. To illustrate the difference, it is important to note that a typical counter-terrorism strategy is centered on the enemy while a classic counterinsurgency is normally centered on the population. However, in a slightly conception, Hoffman argues in support of a neo-classical definition of the term ‘counterinsurgency’ (72). He believes that the newly released Marine counterinsurgency manual deserves acclaim. According to Hoffman, the manual presents a collectivity of the contemporary understanding of insurgency in light of the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

Various schools of thought exist on the issue of modern insurgencies. One of them is the classical school, which is founded upon the ideas of Mao Tse Tung, which dwell mostly on revolutionary warfare. This classical school has had a lot of influence on new conceptions of insurgency, the so called neo-classical conception. Typically, classicists focus mostly on the heyday glory of the events of 1950s and 1960s, during which time revolutionary warfare was in vogue. They also approve of the teachings of Robert Thompson, a British war expert. For many pundits, Thompson is the modern Clausewitz of counterinsurgency. Classists are normally quick to ignore the unique aspects of the colonial and Maoist wars of liberation and instead to generalize the principles that can be derived from them.

From a theoretical perspective, pundits are normally quick to acknowledge counterinsurgency is normally as much a part of the problem as it is a part of the solution. In a typical case of elaboration, a quagmire presents itself from which it is not possible to come up with a short-term solution. Combat operations rarely win wars in a counterinsurgency; instead judicious use of firepower always works pretty well. This entails use of use in a careful and in as discriminatory a manner as possible. The military personnel have to be careful not to end up creating more insurgents than the ones they have killed or captured. Agility is also a key requirement, whereby trust is vested in the lower rank for purposes of making on-the-spot but crucial decisions. In essence, military and civil operations have to cut across many lines or sectors, key among them security, politics, information sectors, for which the level of progress has to be uniform.

In most cases, training manuals of the US military tend to be influence by the views of classicists. An excellent example is the observation that many of the factors that motivate modern-day insurgents are not included in historical trends, and they do not adhere to previously identified phases either. Even insurgent organizations tend to be vastly different, such that it is not possible to tie their operations within one theory or school of thought. More importantly, there are instances where insurgents fail to pursue clearly-stipulated political goals or attainable, measurable objectives. Some of them are not motivated by the need to overthrow the existing government or control of the ability by the state to control. For such insurgents, the mere act of participation in the internal conflicts appears satisfying.

Away from the classical and neo-classical approaches, Reed explores the social network approach in the understanding of the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency (31). Reed notes that although the study of interactions, networks, and relationships from an academic perspective boasts of a long history, not much has been written about their applicability in the theory of counterinsurgency (38). However, Reeds contends that in order to analyze the concept of counterinsurgency from a network approach, there is a need to rethink some of the conventionally used analytical tools (52). In this regard, war should be thought as an extension of politics and policy with the introduction of the use of military force. In the spectrum of conflict, war takes different forms, with insurgency and counterinsurgency being just some of these forms. From the perspective of the social network approach, each insurgency is unique, and only a few can fit into a rigid classification.

However, there is a form of interconnectedness that characterized the current surges of insurgence. Today, it is easy for insurgents to link up with other ‘like-minded’ groups across states, regions, and even across the world in the pursuit of a common objective. To defeat such a networked enemy, there is need for military players to possess an array of interlinked resources that are imperative for sustenance. Unfortunately, conventional military strategies and ways of thinking seldom allow for such a response. In other words, it is no longer possible for military analysts to simply look at an organizational chart and determine the configuration of the insurgents. It is extremely difficult for a military commander to be able to pick out an insurgent from a gathering of members of the public. Similarly, the idea of an insurgent group under a consistent leader who runs a subordinate organization with a coherent trend of activity is now an illusion of the past.

Analysis of the players, strategy, tactics, and logistics of insurgency and counterinsurgency in both the United States’ conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan

In Vietnam, questions were being raised regarding the US presence in the country, whether there was any chance that the mission there had a chance of succeeding and if the strategy used was the right one. The most important question, though, has been on why the US lost the war in Vietnam. Some critics have argued that the US military failed because of failure to use the tactics and strategies of counterinsurgency. However, the military leaders of the Marine Corp had a clear idea of what was needed to conduct and win a counterinsurgency war.

 

Ives notes that it is not possible to determine whether the Marine strategy could have brought victory for the US in the war (119). It is certain that without the support of the army in other parts of Vietnam, Marine Corps would have been merely an island of counterinsurgency in a sea of sustained attrition warfare. This is not to say that the Marine strategy was an inappropriate one. Indeed, the marine strategy had all the elements required in the conduct of a counterinsurgency war.

 

One of the strategies used by the Marine Corps was pacification. The Corps defined pacification as the military, economic, political, and social process through which a responsive government is established with the aim of encouraging and involving the participation of all the people (Ives 129). From this dimension, the Marine Corps provided security by destroying guerilla infrastructure and engaging in popular involvement to ensure that the government achieved the goal of self-sustenance.

Against this backdrop, the Marine Corps appeared aware of the kind of war that they were fighting and the manner it required to be conducted. The strategy of the US military entailing rooting out guerillas and separating them from the people. One of the priority areas was providing defense to air bases as Chu Lai and Da Nang (Ives 39). Second in terms of priority was to attack the communist main forces so as to ease pressure off the army in South Vietnam. Provide protection to populated areas, and cut off transport and communication links from the Viet Cong men. Thirdly, the Marine Corps sought to provide a very detailed description and analysis of counterinsurgency measures to be undertaken throughout the duration of the war. The political infrastructure needed to be eradicated and the guerillas had to be removed from the people. The aim was to prevent these insurgents from getting supplies and recruiting new members, these two things were always of great use among the Viet Cong. Fourthly, there was need for creating an environment that was favorable for pacification. The climate had to be viable for interaction between the populace and the local defense force in areas where Viet Cong had been wiped out.

The Marine Corps also prepared a strategy for I Corps. This plan contained three main areas: countering the guerillas by simply destroying them, conducting a very large unit for destroying the main forces of both the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong, and conducting pacification with the aim of rebuilding South Vietnam. The Marine Corps countered the guerillas by killing them, destroying all their infrastructure through ambushes, conducting patrols, carrying out county fair operations, and gathering intelligence from civilians. The military also planned to offer training to local security forces to enable them defend the villages. The tactic also entailed large unit operations were normally carried out after reconnaissance so as to locate the main units, with the consequent move taking the form of search-and-destroy missions.

In pacification, five crucial programs were identified, with the first being improving village security through training to local forces. The second one was establishment of a local intelligence net that provided information to the military. The third was the setting up of a village government through which case the Marine offered assistance in carrying a census. Then local officials would be established, followed by provision of security to these officials and nurturing cordial relations with all of them. The fourth program entailed improving the local economy through the creation of local markets, improvement of communication lines, and protection of crops during the time for harvesting. The fourth program was about improving the public health. This goal would be accomplished through provision of medical training and treatment as well as feeding the hungry and evacuating those who were seriously ill. The fifth program was about improving public education, mainly courtesy of Marine efforts to offer support to students, provide English lessons, assist in the construction of schools, and offer vocational training.

In Afghanistan, the level of success by the US military was influenced by among other things, the competence of the Afghan government and its military forces. In this regard, there was a need for the US and the coalition forces to play a role in building competent afghan forces, particularly the police. During the early days of the counterinsurgency, this goal was not properly achieved. One of the problems facing the police training centers in the country was corruption, lack of sufficient resources, loyalty to local commanders instead of the central government.

Another priority area in the US counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan was improving the quality of government at the local level, particularly in rural areas. Owing to the deteriorating security situation, reconstruction normally failed to reach remote parts of the country. The problem was encountered even after the Provincial Reconstruction Teams were set up.

In recent times, the US has been involved in drone attacks aimed at destroying the insurgents’ support base that is in Pakistan. These efforts became more challenging when insurgency broke out in Pakistan, which culminated in the killing of Benazir Bhutto, the former Pakistani opposition leader. Against the backdrop of a situation such as this one, the US policymakers both at the military level and within the inner circles of the US administration have been accused of underestimating the importance of local people in counterinsurgency operations.

Nevertheless, the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan started off on a positive note, following initial victory in the ouster of the Taliban rule in 2001 (Jones 11). In this operation, the US Special Operations combined efforts with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) forces, Afghan indigenous troops and air power. With three months, the Taliban government had collapsed. Some of the individuals who participated in the war pointed out that it was a revitalization of the American art of war. However, the prolonged insurgency that followed cast a shadow of doubt over the future success of the whole operation.

In terms of logistics, the US military established a Movement Control Center in Afghanistan (Drew 102). The MCC center has been helping the Special Operations forces access remote areas within the country so that they can continue with their counterinsurgency mission in an uninterrupted manner. The MCC is made up of 11 personnel, who coordinate efforts by fixed-wing aircraft to expedite the movement of about 600 tons of cargo and 2000 passengers every month (Jones 27). The personnel have all the facilities they need to facilitate the deliver supplies and manpower to all parts of Afghanistan.

In 2009, a new counterinsurgency strategy was launched in Afghanistan, and the aim this time was to increase support for the Afghan government in Kabul. This strategy was hatched by General Stanley McChrystal, the Afghan military commander for the US troops, in the wake of a refusal by the US administration to send thousands of more troops US forces into the insurgency-torn Middle Eastern country. In the run-up to the new request, McChrystal had been pulling back his forces from sparsely populated areas where the most heated fire exchanges with the insurgents were taking place. Instead of fighting in these areas, the military chiefs opted to prioritize on major population areas.

The logic of the new strategy was that if the politics of the country fail, the war was going to be lost as well. The strategy was greatly influenced by local politics, since it was unveiled at a time when Afghanistan was conducting a presidential election. At the same time, opinion remained divided in Washington on whether additional forces could bring the war to the victory lap or it could bring more problems into the country. Such wrangling is an indication of lack of a properly thought-out plan, worse than that of Vietnam. Indeed, President Obama’s reason for refusing to send any more troops into Afghanistan in 2009 was that no effective counterinsurgency strategy had been put in place. The second reason was about the need for the Afghan government to be one that is generally recognized and one that had the support of the Afghan people. In regard, President Obama appeared to appreciate the fact that the counterinsurgency war was not going to be won if the people sided with the insurgents instead of a government that has gotten into power on the back of persistent claims of election fraud.

Comparison of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and Afghanistan

There are some similarities as well as differences between the strategies employed in Afghanistan and those employed in Vietnam. One of the similarities is the acknowledgement of the role that the local population plays in ensuring that the war is won. In Vietnam, the Marine Corps embarked on a program of educating people in the villages as well as strengthening local governments. In return, it was hoped that these people would cooperate in the counterinsurgency by providing intelligence about the Viet Cong insurgents. Similarly, the Special Operation Units and coalition forces have emphasizing the need to cooperate with indigenous armed forces and the local administration. The only difference arises with regard to the new Afghanistan strategy introduced in 2009, which directed focus towards highly populated areas in Kabul.

Just like in Vietnam, the counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan have been under the influence of politics in Washington, with opinion remaining sharply divided on whether more troops should be sent there, and whether the war was necessary in the first place. When campaigning, one of President Obama’s promises was to withdraw the US troops from Afghanistan, arguing that this war was not necessary in the first place. Similar opposition was expressed during the Kennedy administration, and it ultimately influenced the withdrawal plan that was implemented by successive administrations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has outlined definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency from a theoretical perspective. It has also provided an analysis of the counterinsurgency strategy employed by the US military in Vietnam and Afghanistan by identifying the main players, military strategies, tactics, and logistics. From a comparison of these two counterinsurgency efforts, it is clear that the circumstances in which the wars were fought were different. In Vietnam, the Cold War context presented different realities than those of Afghan war on terror. A major difference is that the Vietnam strategy was proper while that of Afghanistan was not. In the case of Vietnam, other factors may have contributed to the defeat of the Marine Corps and the army, but the counterinsurgency strategy, it seems, was the right one. There is scantiness of literature on the Afghanistan counterinsurgency strategy and more research is needed in this area.

 

Works Cited

Drew, Dennis. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals, Montgomery: Air University Press, 2004.

Hoffman, Frank. “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?” Parameters 2.3 (2007): 71-87.

Ives, Christopher. US Special Forces and counterinsurgency in Vietnam: military innovation and institutional failure, New York: Routledge.

Jones, Seth. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, New York: The Rand Corporation, 2011.

Jones, Seth. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, New York: The Rand Corporation, 2008.

Reed, Brian. “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgence”, Information for the Defense Community, 4.2 (2009): 12-93.

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