This paper assesses the role of Islam in the reluctance by EU to accept Turkey’s EU membership request. The Islamic views of the Turkish people are explored in light of the country’s aspiration to join the EU. The dynamics of politics in the country are analyzed with a view to establish any possible association with the changing fortunes in its quest for EU membership.

The paper makes use of qualitative data, secondary analysis, and analysis of documents. Both rationalist and constructivist approaches are used to explain the EU integration phenomenon. On the one hand, various misconceptions about Turkey by EU member countries are discussed, followed by an assessment of how the Islam factor plays out in the accession debate. On the other hand, the paper analyzes the Islamic character of Turkish politics and its influence on Turkey’s EU membership.

Introduction

Background of the study

Turkey has for a long time being aspiring to join the European Union (EU). Turkey’s first efforts towards accession to the EU were made in 1959, when the country applied for an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC). In this application, Turkey hoped to be associated with the West and to maintain favorable economic relations with the EEC, a trading block that exhibited an immense potential for the future. The negotiations bore fruits with the signing of the agreement in 1963. Turkey also went on to sign the Additional Protocol in 1971 in efforts to strength and widen the scope of political and economic relations even further. These measures contributed greatly to Turkey’s pursuit of the Westernization policy.

One of the factors that have always influenced Turkey’s push for EU membership is religion. According to Flam, the Islam factor has greatly contributed to great controversy in the debate on whether Turkey should become an EU member or not (203). The country faces numerous challenges arising from not just high population and economic problems, but also religious differences. Turkey applied for a full membership of the EU in 1987, which was rejected on grounds that Turkey was not yet ready for EU membership. The rejection marked the start of turbulence and strategically shifting relations both on the part of the EU and Turkey. In 1996, Turkey joined the EU’s Customs Union, and three years later, the country was accorded the official candidacy status. This marked the beginning of sustained EU influence on Turkish domestic and foreign policies.

Regarding the public perceptions towards EU membership, it seems that the Turkish people fall into either of three categories. The first one is spearheaded by Islamists under the patronage of the AKP government. The second category is under the military, Kemalists, and nationalists, who operate under the consensus of CHP, the main opposition party. Thirdly, there is the business category, and the people in this group often try to say detached from all political segmentations with regard to the economic aspects of the EU membership. The three main business groups are TUSIAD, MUSIAD, and labor unions. These three groups (AKP, CHP, and business categories) are rarely in agreement on domestic issues. According to Nora Onar, three are three major political forces within the Turkish society: Islamists, liberals, and Kemalists.

Önis notes that today, religion is clearly a concern for the European Union in the ongoing discussions for Turkey’s membership (271). The question on whether Islam is a key challenging factor for Turkey’s membership in the EU first emerged during the late 1980s when the country’s full membership into the EU started being discussed. Daloglu argues that there is a sort of triangular relationship among Turkey, Islam, and EU. Turkey’s relations with the EU took a nosedive following the military coups that occurred in 1960 and 1980. Following the reinstatement of a civilian government following the 1980 coup, Turkey braced herself for candid observations from the EU, whereby cultural and religious differences were cited as major stumbling blocks to the EU membership. The EU conspicuously took two years (1987-1989) to decide on rejecting Turkey’s EU membership application.

One of the factors that makes the EU consider religious differences in the case of Turkey is simply the ideas that have for a long time been established on European identity. For this reason, Turkey’s Islamic roots may be playing a key role in reluctance by the EU to accept the country into the union. Moreover, as Tekin indicates, key consideration should be put on the rising Islamic nature of Turkish politics, in which case the current AKP government is strongly rooted in Islamic views (292). Furthermore, Turkey is a religiously segmented society, whereby the ruling AKP party follows Islamic ideologies while CHP, the main opposition party, is founded on secular views. Such polarization extends into the business community, with the secular views of TUSIAD (secular old Turkish business elites) being pitted against those of the religious MUSIAD (the Muslim Businessmen Association).

Aim of the research

The aim of this paper is to determine the role that Islam plays in the reluctance by the EU to accept Turkey’s EU membership. The paper also sets out to determine whether Islamic views among the Turkish people contribute to their views towards Turkey’s membership in the EU. Consideration is put on EU’s doubts on Islam and commitment to democracy, which have been reinforced by various events, including the 9/11 attacks and the London bombings.

The paper also explores the dynamics of politics in Turkey, particularly the recent shift towards the rising Islamic character of domestic politics. There is no doubt that the Turkish public’s religious views impact on the arguments they raise for and against EU accession. In this regard, this study explores the question of whether Islamic views significantly impact on the public’s perception of the country membership in the EU. This bring into sharp focus the segmented nature of the Turkish society, whereby some people choose to remain secular while others continue to hold extreme Islamic views. This religious fragmentation is assessed both in the political and business arena and implications drawn views on EU membership.

Research questions

The following are the research questions that this paper set out to answer:

What role does Islam play in Turkey-EU relations?
Is EU’s reluctance to admit Turkey into the EU because of the country’s Islamic roots?
Do the Turkish public’s Islamic views have a significant influence on their attitudes towards EU accession?
Is the increasingly Islamic nature of the Turkish AKP government a threat to EU accession?

Methodology

This study employs two qualitative research methods: secondary data and analysis of documents. The choice of qualitative methods over quantitative methods arises from the need to understand and interpret the social world from perspective of the people under study. Moreover, choice of quantitative methods would create the impression that the subjects being studied are not capable of their own, independent conception of their immediate social environment.

Secondary data

Secondary data obtained in individual research studies is analyzed, reinterpreted, and synthesized before comparisons are made with the outcomes of different studies. This approach is chosen chiefly because it is both cost-effective and time-efficient. Data that was obtained at different times is combined into one coherent research paper that facilitates a deeper understanding of all variations and relationships among them. The issue of Islam in Turkey spans for a very long time, longer than even the country’s adventure of joining the EU. In both variables, however, qualitative data will be used to determine dynamics and forecasts. Moreover, various issues will be addressed qualitatively with the aim of matching empirical data with what is proposed in theory.

However, some shortcomings of secondary data will have to be appreciated, for instance, the possibility of some variables not being comprehensively covered. This situation arises because the data used in the research studies under investigation has not been collected by the researcher. In this case, the main limitation arises during comparisons of different variables. Regarding the authenticity of the data, this limitation is overcome by relying only on scholarly and peer-reviewed data as well as studies done by reliable sources.

Analysis of documents

Literature on Turkey’s EU membership is analyzed, such that it is possible for the researcher to assess what different commentators said on same events. This helps the researcher explore different ways of reasoning before arriving at any conclusions. The main documents analyzed include surveys, Turkish and foreign press, official documents authored by the EU institutions, and other papers commissioned by Turkish authorities.

Theoretical framework

Today, anti-Islamic rhetoric has pervaded Europe. This paper dwells largely on as many succinct representation of Turkey across Europe as possible. It applies the theoretical framework described by Levin, which acknowledges the existence of stereotypes of Turks as providing the image of ‘Other’, against which the European ‘Self’ image is contrasted (21). In his analysis, Levin adopts a constructivist view of history, develops a highly sophisticated conception of collectivity of identity and addresses the issue of Europe’s numerous encounters with Islam (82). According to Levin, the images that Europeans have held for a long time regarding Muslims represent a troubling history of Europe’s interaction with Islam.

In Levin’s analysis, historical, conceptual, and psychological perspectives are used to explain the uneasy relations between Europe and Turkey and how this historical legacy influences the potential for Turkey to accede into the EU (16). The nature of Europe’s relations with Turkey keeps changing, and such change is highly likely to influence how soon this country becomes a part of the EU zone. By reflecting on the Islam factor from a constructivist perspective, it is possible to make sense of all the qualitative data analysis, a goal that this paper sets out to achieve.

Constructivist theories question the materialism exhibited in most contemporary theories of international relations. The claim made by constructivists is that since the end of the Cold War, it was conventionally understood that international relations depend heavily upon human actions, interactions, and understanding, such that they are not fixed. For this reason, the international system can easily be anarchical by virtue of lacking a central government as claimed by realists. Instead, rules are determined purely by human actions. For this reason, the rules of human action as well as those derived from international anarchy best explain the dynamics of international practices.

The institutionalized norms of Europe’s attitudes towards Turkey and Islam are borne out of the ideas and values of the social environment within which Europeans act. From the perspective of constructivist theories, all actors are social, meaning that all their identities are constituted using the institutionalized values, norms, and ideas of their immediate social environment. In sharp contrast to rationalist theories, which take actors’ interests to be always affected by social interactions, constructivist conceptions consider the social world to be a constitutive sphere that determines the worldview of the actors.

The constructivist view is expounded by Levin using the notion of ‘Self’ to refer to the EU and ‘Other’ to refer to countries with elements of Islam such as Turkey. From this perspective, the most crucial side of international relations is viewed to be social. In this case, the social sphere is taken to be shaped chiefly by the beliefs and ideas of the actors. Once these beliefs and ideas change, they influence the social sphere, which also changes as well.

The process of creating international institutions such as the EU is dependent on consensus over norms and values. This is the reason why the issue of religion is very critical in Turkey’s accession into the EU today. International organizations are highly likely to emerge in situations where the norms and values represented gain widespread acceptance by all the participating societies. This is what happened when the EU was being formed. Any attempts by countries that did not initially share in the social beliefs, norms, and values when the EU was first being formed may not be readily accepted into the already-formed institution.

The notions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ are critical in efforts to understand the religious aspects of relations between Europe and Islam. These notions facilitate a deeper understanding of the ways in which different countries perceive problems. In most cases, there is a uniform perception that institutions matter. The only difference regards how the institutions matter. From a constructivist perspective, institutions matter in the sense that they not only affect all actors, but also their identities as well. For instance, in the European integration, the resulting institution has undoubtedly resulted in a transformative effect on the European state system. The integration process has affected the identity of various countries and their people, leading to changes in the behaviors and interests of states.

Islam as a factor in EU’s approach to Turkey’s membership

Misconceptions about Turkey

Relations between EU and Turkey are full of prejudices and misconceptions, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Both supporters and opponents of its accession to the EU consider it a Muslim or ‘Islamic’ nation. The country’s geopolitical context inspires many in Europe to point out religion as a key defining feature of what Turkey really is and the contribution it can make to the EU. Such an understanding of Turkey makes the accession debate very problematic. When Turkey is misperceived through the lens of Islam, it is viewed as the ‘other’, an assumption that in the long run has hindered the country’s European integration.

Grabbe notes that at all times, viewing Turkey as an Islamic country works to the detriment of Turkey –EU relations (4). In historical contexts, when debate on civilization shapes the Europeans’ self-understanding, Turkey ends up falling into the ‘wrong’ category. The country ends up being lumped together with other millions of people on the basis of their traditions, religions, cultures, and languages. Such people and their societies are grouped into the category of ‘Other’.

In the case of Turkey, integration into the EU is often being resisted by people who associate it with the persistent failure in integrating migrant Muslim communities in Europe. The expected failure of integration of these migrant Muslim communities, increases fears about the numerous negative effects of Turkey’s to the European Union. Moreover, there is the fear of the inability by the EU to press Turkey into complying with the conditions set out before accession. Such conditions have to do with European beliefs, codes of action, norms, and values. In some cases, these arguments border on outright xenophobia and racism.

Sometimes the notion of fear of Turkey’s accession is transposed into the thorny issues of insecurity and ‘Islamic terrorism’. This perception is often caused by the existence of the idea of ‘other’ as opposed to the ‘self’ image of the typical European citizen. In most cases, such arguments turn out to be ill-founded. Indeed, they mirror certain instances of integration in the past, for example Algerians in France, Moroccans in Spain, and Pakistanis in the UK. In these situations, the European identity was at play in determining the effects of such bold measures. According to Lake, these situations provided a clear proof of the difficulties that arise whenever attempts are made to define identity and religion in pragmatic terms (193). In most cases, a key presumption was that the notion of identity is always indispensable in the integration debate, even where no causal links existed.

In some situations, albeit frequently, the notion of ‘otherness’ is used to support the case for Turkey’s accession to the EU. In Öni’s view, those who offer this support to put into consideration the issue of domestic policy, whereby Turkey’s membership in the EU could be used to aid in integrating Muslim immigrants into European countries (11). Such integration, the argument goes, would take place regardless of whether the communities in question have any Turkish connection that goes beyond the loose religious link. Moreover, such integration is seen as holding a blessing in disguise, in that it could great help the EU deal with most of its security threats as well as seize many opportunities existing in the turbulent Middle East.

Interestingly, even the arguments that are offered in favor of integration are often inspired by prejudices and notions of ‘other’. For instance, in accepting Turkey’s bid to join the EU, acceptance would be taken as a ‘litmus test’ of demonstrating that Islam is compatible with democracy. In this case, the lesson that EU countries would emphasize most is that other ‘Islamic’ countries need to follow in the footsteps of Turkey and embark on a democratization process. In essence, Turkey would be acting as a key bridge to the Islamic world. Indeed, the suggestion here is that Turkey’s role is critical in EU’s efforts to penetrate the East in its efforts to dispel the security threats that exist in this region. For the EU, the most worrisome security threats are illegal migration and terrorism.

The positive and especially negative arguments that are made in the case of Turkey exemplify the mental categories at play in the accession debate. These mental categories make the deliberations appear like a ‘clash of civilizations’ or, in the case of acceptance, benign variants of ‘dialogue of civilizations’. In both cases, however, there is an artificial classification and definition of categories, chiefly on the basis of the hypothesis that Turkey should act as a ‘litmus test’ for reconciling two radically different world. At the outset, these arguments are problematic. They are not only superficial but also prejudiced; they only hinder the attainment of consensus between Turkey and the EU on the issue of accession.

Islam as a factor in EU’s conditionality on Turkey

Within the political realm, the challenges that seem to have been identified rather well are many. The perspective of Turkey’s membership has led to the introduction of many reforms as well as a break-up of many taboos that seemed hitherto indispensable. However, this whole accession process has been used by the EU as a launching pad to attack the Islamic-leaning AKP government. Yet Turkey is already facing many internal political problems with regard to both the EU as well as other specific member states.

Oguzlu observes that at face value, the conditions that the EU has put to Turkey appear similar to those that have been imposed on any other past candidates (101). However, on the political sphere, the EU has imposed conditions with regard to the limitations of freedoms of people who follow non-Muslim religions. Other political conditions dwell on the Kurdish question, the role of the military, and the judiciary. On the question of Islam, the EU seems to favor the secular establishment, which accuses the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of having an Islamist ‘hidden agenda’. On the whole picture, the EU finds itself in a dilemma of whether to support the Islamist government or to tolerance the control of the military, an institution has already managed to command enormous respect and confidence among the Turkish people.

Negative feelings and prejudices about Turkey’s candidacy vary across Europe in terms of distribution. Countries with huge Muslim communities such Germany, Denmark, Belgium, France, and Austria express strong opposition to Turkey’s accession. Although the reservations expressed by these countries differ, they largely stem from the failure of most of the integration policies that had been set up for certain Western European countries. In those countries, immigrants continue to stick to their distinct habits, culture, and religions. They seem to have completely rejected today’s Western value system. However, following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent growth in Islamic fundamentalism, these EU countries have been expressing outright disapproval of Muslim immigrants. Those who refuse to trust these ‘Muslim aliens’ often forget or neglect the basic fact that like other countries, Turkey has its own uniqueness as a geo-political entity.

In Central and Eastern Europe, instances of anti-Muslim prejudices are few and far between. Whenever they occur, it happens that the main complainants are smaller member states such as Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, and Latvia. Moreover, the opposition occurs for different reasons altogether. In most cases, these countries have been opposed to Turkey’s membership because they fear that such membership would mark a shift of EU resources away from them. Meanwhile, in all EU member states, the Islam-related prejudices and preconceptions tend to be weakest among cultural and political elites.

Togan points out that in Austria, the issues of Islam as well as integration of Muslim communities remain matters of a lot of concern (1031). The fears are inspired by incidents such as the London Bombings, which were carried out by recruits from migrant Muslim communities that had seemingly been integrated and the riots in French suburbs. These events brought to the fore the reality that Europe has to deal with the issue of Islam, which has been neglected for decades. Unfortunately, in the wake of 9/11, the debate on this issue has tended to revolve around the perceived connection between Islam/Muslims and terrorism, leading to a heightened sense of suspicion.

On an interesting note, Góra points out that member states that are in an exposed geographical position mainly at the borders of the EU such as Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Britain, and Sweden have tended to have been positive on the question of Turkey’s membership (3). In fact, this view has been more positive than that of states that lie within Europe’s geographical core. Basically, the Turkish question offers many insights into the present condition in Europe, its contemporary problems, and its painful search for an identity.

The question of ‘Islamist’ fears and EU’s identity crisis

The views expressed by certain EU leaders clearly indicate that EU is facing an identity crisis as it endeavors to find a solution on the issue of Turkey. EU president Herman Van Rompuy is on record as saying that Turkey’s entry into the EU would undermine Europe’s Christian values, chiefly because it is a predominantly Muslim state. Van Rompuy added that an expansion to include Turkey ought not to be considered similar to any other expansion in the past. Such sentiments represent outright prejudice and discrimination on the part of the EU leadership. Meanwhile, such views portray the identity crisis that the EU currently finds itself in, especially whenever an issue of inviting new members arises.

Similarly, Arikan quotes President Nicolas Sarkozy as stating in 2007 that he did not think that Turkey has any place in Europe (28). In fact, the president had already made a speech a year earlier, where he said that Lebanon and Israel had more European values compared to Turkey. Sarkozy reiterated that although he was not against Muslims and Turks, he would not want to see an Asian state becoming an EU member. Similarly, Sarkozy expressed unwillingness to see the problems of Hizbullah, Kurds, and Palestine become European problems. There are many European leaders who share the same line of thinking with Sarkozy and Rompuy. The identity crisis of the EU is clearly discernible in their tone regarding Turkey’s membership, especially considering their unwillingness to see an EU that neighbors Iran and Iraq.

The general feeling among many EU leaders who oppose Turkey’s move is that although this country may have achieved certain milestones in human rights, economics, and democratization, it is better of forming alliances with Arab countries than with European countries. The underlying identity issue here is that European civilization, having been founded on largely Christian values, is best not interfered with by countries that are products of other civilizations. It is rather interesting that Turkey’s economic status has not been linked with its rejection by the EU. Moreover, Turkey is reputed as the most democratized Muslim nation in the world, yet this fact is rarely pointed out during deliberations on EU membership. This makes many people to make the outright claim that the country’s rejection is based solely on culture and religion.

Felipe Gonzalez, former Spanish Prime Minister is also on record as having said that Europe ought to stop at the Turkish border chiefly because of cultural, religious, and social differences. In essence, Gonzalez was echoing Sarkozy’s worry, which he had already expressed by posing the question ‘so who is European and who is not?’ For such leaders, the impression created is that it is not possible for one to be Muslim, Turkish, and European at the same time. In this case, the only thing that could explain why the current EU members are ‘European’ and Turkey is not is simply identity. The apparent identity crisis in this case arises because of EU’s dilemma on whether the integration with Turkey should be partial, full, or should not be there at all.

Opponents of integration openly dwell on the long-running feeling that Islam and the Ottoman Empire have for centuries been acting as ‘the other’ to all the peoples of Europe. In fact, this feeling has always been the basis of the drastic change within the Turkish Republic since the Ottoman Empire ended. Since the last days of the Ottoman Empire, attempts were made to reform and liberalize Turkey politically with an aim of increasing the power of the state within the new world order. Incidentally, Islam remained part of these reforms. In fact, it was used as glue that bound the Turkish people together. Moreover, Kemal Ataturk introduced Kemalism, a westernizing ideology based on the incontrovertible maxims of secularism.

This stark difference in terms of identity is the one of the reasons why EU countries are at easy with Turkey’s full membership. Meanwhile, the Turkish opinion leaders and political strategists have for a long time acknowledged the fact that for their country to be included in the future Europe, the Islamic culture must be made to appear ‘less visible’ across Turkey. The comments made by various European leaders have only served to confirm these fears on the part of the Turkish people. For instance, former French president Jacques Chirac noted in a 2005 interview that ‘for Turkey to become a full EU member, it needs to go through a cultural transformation’.

Indeed, Turkey seems to have been going through a Westernization process not just after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, but for the past 200 years. In fact, all this time, its process of identity manipulation closely resembles the one that the EU has been undergoing over the last three decades. However, in Turkey, there is a nationalism paradox that triggered both hostility towards and imitation of western ways in equal measure. On the whole picture, however, the modernization process has continued since the turn of the 19^th century.

When viewed through the lens of Turkey’s long struggle to adopt modernity, opponents at the EU seem to be only contributing to a national debate that has been ongoing for a long time. In this case, the struggle has been between traditionalist Islamists and westernizing Kemalists, both competing for Turkey’s soul. For many decades, Kemalists were being supported in their efforts to Europeanize Turkey by admitting the country into several ‘Western Clubs’, namely the Council of Europe, NATO, and OECD. However, the country’s fractious relationship with the Europe since it first applied for membership in 1959 has kept the debate on identity alive. In this case, both Turkey and the EU have continued to ponder over which identity, Islamic or Western, is best for Turkey.

Islamic character of Turkish politics and its influence on Turkey’s EU membership

In recent years, the Turkish political identity has become largely Islamic in character. The ruling AKP party has an Islamic leaning. AKP leaders assert that although their government has an Islamic background, it is committed to the rule of law, democratic values, and integration with Europe. Moreover, as Cizre observes, most AKP supporters maintain that Turkey’s Islamic identity is not a barrier to the country’s integration into the EU (118). Moreover, the Kemalist model has ceased to be viewed as an asset in Turkey-EU relations because of the way in which it suppresses Islam. Moreover, Kemalism has continued to be perceived negatively because of its suppression of Islam, reliance on the military’s legitimacy, and continued discrimination against Kurds.

The drive by Islamism to the West continues to be motivated by the acceptance that all the values that are enforced and legitimized as part of the European identity would easily transform into acceptance of Islam as part of the continually enlarging European culture. However, as Erdogdu observes, this change has completely transformed Islamism and the identity of the whole of Turkey (46). To make this clear, one needs to make the obvious observation that a political movement that supports the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and EU integration cannot be regarded as being Islamic. Moreover, this is the case if such a political movement manages to garner votes from all sections of the Turkish society.

AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) party’s Islamic roots and local politics

The AKP has clear Islamic roots, and many people in the Turkish opposition view it as a threat to secularism in the country. The party got victory in the parliamentary election of November 2002, and again in 2007. AKP came to power against the backdrop of its fresh image amid highly prevalent corruption within the country’s established political parties. However, critics are yet to agree on whether AKP is a threat to secularism or a product of it. Some claim that the party is the Turkish equivalent of many Christian Democrat political parties that have mushroomed across Europe. Others perceive it as an Islamist Trojan horse.

According to Rahigh-Aghsan, AKP’s victories in 2002 and 2007 are considered a major setback in the Turkey’s aspiration to join the European Union (44). These victories marked the rise of political Islam within Turkey. They triggered an intense debate about the country’s eligibility to join the EU. However, Rahigh-Aghsan argues that even if the AKP government met the objective criteria set out by the EU, the European opposition to Turkey’s accession would still persist. (48). The reasons given by Rahigh-Aghsan are two-fold. First, the underlying targets of Turkey’s political Islam appear less compatible with the traditional quest for EU integration that previous governments have been enthusiastically pursuing. Secondly, the turnaround towards Turkish political Islamism is contributing to a wave of skepticism across Europe, thereby presenting significant obstacles to EU integration.

Rahigh-Aghsan observes that since the start of the AKP’s second term, the impetus of the domestic reform process that was specified in 1993 by the Copenhagen European Council as well as the 2005 accession negotiation framework has declined dramatically (46). This sentiment is echoed by many other scholars, although they fail to agree on why this is the case. Meanwhile, current literature on the unwillingness by the AKP government to continue with reform packages offers two succinct explanations. The first one focuses on the influence of religion on the attempt by the AKP government to access the EU. The second explanation puts most emphasis on structural factors.

Regarding religious influences, it is normally presupposed that the EU would be unwilling to accede to the demands of an Islamic party, since Islamism only reinforces the perception of incompatibility between Turkey’s Islamic and cultural traditions and ‘European values’. Several explanations exist with regard to the loss of enthusiasm by the AKP government to implement the reform packed so as to meet the accession requirements. A key explanation is that this move is deeply rooted in the party’s shift towards increased emphasis on ecumenism and authority. According to Rahigh-Aghsan, an irreconcilable divide seems to exist between the cultural orientation of secular liberals and that of religious Muslims (49). In the explanation that puts most emphasis on structural factors, the main variables under consideration include state repression and reward, strategic calculation, legal protection for allowing the opportunity of governance, and economic opportunity spaces.

However, through a rational argument, it can be seen that the AKP government seems to have created policies on the basis of existing opportunity structures as opposed to ideological change. Indeed, this is the reason why the AKP is conventionally thought of as a very adaptable party, one that is characterized by rationalism, despite it being an Islamic party. A case of its being rational presented itself in 2002 immediately after coming to power, when it undertook unexpected measures to enter into a compromise with the Kemalist establishment regarding the maintenance of both domestic and international legitimacy.

AKP leaders seem to believe in the need to establish a platform for launching an unconditional pursuit of membership in the EU in spite of the party’s Islamist pedigree. In this case, the popular observation among the leaders is the notion of AKP being a product of an ongoing process of domestically liberalizing political Islam. Whether or not EU members appreciate this shift in AKP’s thinking is yet to be known and seemingly beside the point. The increased domination of the AKP by new intellectuals and Antolian Muslim bourgeoisie creates the impression that the party is keen to create a balance between secularism, democracy, and religion in the public sphere.

In some respects, the loss of enthusiasm by the AKP in pushing for the EU accession reform package is viewed as resulting from internal tensions within the party over how to broaden its appeal. This tension emanates from the ongoing democratization wave within the Turkish society. It is also contributed to by the ongoing structural, cultural, and economic changes within Turkey.

During the AKP’s second term, efforts towards Turkey’s Europeanization have reduced dramatically. This has triggered an increased focus on the aspect of political Islamic activism that is little-known outside Turkey, particularly with regard to EU affairs. Indeed, there is sufficient grounds to support the claim that the AKP government is not as pro-European as many scholars think. AKP leaders obviously understand the geopolitical relevance of their country, and they could be using this aspect to reinforce the notion of Turkish otherness as a way of establishing a stable platform for negotiating with EU leaders. This could be a well thought-out strategy of preserving national respect and dignity in the face of long-standing aspirations towards Europeanization.

Since the rise of AKP, the party has adopted a moderate policy towards EU accession. In 2002, the party’s leaders declared that they would pursue secularism as a way of protecting all beliefs and religions. They promised to guarantee secularism and to prove this in the course of their activities of managing the country. This triggered much optimism, making 2002 to be heralded as a new dawn for Turkey. Indeed, according to the Guardian newspaper, a new dawn had come, whereby Islam and democracy were seen to have combined forces. However, two years after ascending to power, AKP’s legacy appeared mixed. Whereas president Erdoğan continued the push for EU accession, his party was also busy putting forward a proposal that would enable students from Islamic secondary schools to join secular universities. This would in effect waive the secular subjects that were always a requirement before one joined university.

In the current situation, anti-Americanism remains strife both in the Turkish society and within the ranks of AKP. Even before the start of the war on Iraq, relations between Turkey and the US had become strained. Turkish newspapers that maintained a close links with AKP started spinning conspiracy theories to attack prominent figures within the Bush administration. Moreover, the AKP has been actively working to downgrade any relations with Israel. Even president Erdoğan is on record for having referred to Israel as a ‘terrorist’ state several times. Such negative attitudes towards the West only make Turkey appear to be portraying the characteristics of Middle Eastern countries were Islamic fundamentalism is rife.

Some analysts claim that AKP enjoyed a large parliamentary majority mainly for technical reasons. What is clear, though, is that AKP has clearly Islamist roots, which continue to influence the way the country approaches the issue of EU accession. Meanwhile, it may be wrong to assume that the coming to power of an Islamist political party has anything to do with a national trend towards Islamism. Indeed, the party’s victory was caused more by public disgust over corruption than by an increase in Islamic sentiments. In the run-up to the 2002 election, the long-feuding coalition parties were being blamed for the banking and currency crises that occurred between 2000 and 2001. In 2001, the per capital income of the country had taken a serious hit when the Turkish lira lost a third of its value.

Top leaders at AKP always know better than to talk too overtly about Islamist goals. This is a mistake that the current leader, Erdoğan, has learnt to avoid, having erred several times as mayor and paid dearly for it. However, the care that the party has been taking not to advance any Islamist agenda is there for all the Turkish people to see. This is because, occasionally, the party floats a trial balloon for certain social reforms that touch on Islamism. One of the ways through which the party has been endeavoring to conceal the Islamic agenda is by embracing the EU agenda.

The underlying aim of AKP’s leaders has been to have their party recognized as a ‘conservative democratic’ party as opposed to an Islamist party. However, the main obstacle in this effort has remained the shadowy figures of top party leaders who have in the past been key figures in Turkey’s political Islam. When the AKP formed a single-party government in 2002, it became the second pious Muslim ruling party in the country’s history to do so. No wonder its election success was a big surprise to numerous other political parties, as well as civilian, military, and civil-societal actors.

The twin issues of EU’s membership and liberalization of the economy have dominated the AKP’s efforts to conceal its Islamist identity. In front of the EU, the party’s leaders would want AKP to be viewed as being constituted by ‘Conservative Democrats’, the equivalent of ‘Christian Democrats’ in Europe. However, since the party’s cadres remain deeply rooted in Islam, it has become increasingly difficult to convince EU leaders as well as the entire western world that Turkey is a Europeanized nation. Against such suspicions, the party’s leadership continues to argue that everything has changed, even going as far as to acknowledge Turkey’s secular sensitivity.

Islamic influence of Turkish political parties: impact on EU accession efforts

Majority of the Turkish people are Muslims. According to Fokasa, Turks appear euro-skeptic for reasons such as the need for national protection of minorities, problems relating to the so-called ‘sensitive issues’, and lack of knowledge, (81). In the environment of persistent misinformation, the EU has not been very helpful, instead using the Turkish issue as a tool in domestic politics. Both domestically and abroad, the Islam issue continues to shape perceptions on the unfolding accession debate.

The Turkish people understand that the question of EU membership is very critical in determining the country’s destiny with regard to the way several societal issues are handled. One of these issues relates to the debate on whether to Islamize the country or to preserve the secular heritage. All mainstream parties in Turkey are either in support of EU membership or have not expressed strong or public opposition to the idea. The recent shift of the debate from a ‘foreign policy’ issue to a national sovereignty versus liberalization axis has been caused by the EU conditionality, which touches on all the so-called ‘sensitive issues’.

The most interesting thing, though, is that even those parties that have Islamic roots and are opposed to the accession idea do not do so with extremist attitudes. In other words, there are no tough Euro-skeptics, as some commentators in the EU would like to believe. For most opponents, reservations arise mainly with regard to the way the recession process is being carried out and not membership as such. This creates hope among many pro-accession parties that laws that dwell on sensitive issues can be harmonized. Although parties with a very strong Islamic affiliation may appear very firm on sensitive issues, they often come out as soft Euro-skeptics. Their opposition seems to be not against membership as such, but only against certain policies.

The Kemalist thinking in the Turkish society may be attributed to the situation whereby hard-line Islamic views regarding EU membership do not exist. For a long time, the Kemalists have created a strict understanding of secularism, whereby there is no place for Islam in the public sphere. In fact, such a stand has culminated in the banning of a number of pro-Islamic parties by the country’s Constitutional Court, apparently in efforts to ‘safeguard laicism and state order’. Some supporters of such pro-Islamic parties support EU membership because of their belief that the new jurisdiction would offer legal protection to those parties, thereby helping them avoid continued exclusion of Islam from the country’s public sphere.

Oguzlu observes that at a time when the support of the EU accession is declining abroad, the debate is no longer restricted to the pros and cons of accession (98). In each candidate country, the debate extends to important issues affecting the society as a whole such as religion. In Turkey, this debate centers on the clash between Islamization and preservation of the secularization heritage more than anything else. Since all mainstream parties either accept the EU membership idea or are not strongly opposed to it, the public has a crucial role to play in the decision. This is the reason why some commentators point to the possibility of holding a referendum to determine whether the country should accede to the EU or not.

The place of Islam in Turkey

Islam in Turkey is best viewed in the context of the ongoing struggle between Islamism and Kemalist secularism. However, others view Islamism in the context of the traditional Anatolia’s long-running struggle against authoritarianism. Ultimately, the Islamist-oriented Anatolia has emerged as a challenge to the secular roots of the modern Turkish state. Another dimension involves the troubled Turkish identity, which is a subject of contracted internal tumult. From this perspective, one easily appreciates the way in which power struggle influences every aspect of the Turkish society.

Islam is a crucial factor in the way Turkey argues out its case before the EU. Geopolitically, the country is situated in a buffer zone between Europe and the Middle East. Barysch argues that as a powerful country, Turkey adheres to a Pan-Islamic model with the ability to extend far and wide, extending its influence to diverse geographical areas, notably the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Persia (48). In contrast, a weak Turkey ceases to be a key geopolitical entity into a wasteland.

The concept of Turkish nationalism as defined in Kemalism also remains a key factor in determining the extent of Islam’s influence. Kemalism was introduced by Mustafa Kemal, a great leader whose name appears in the country’s currency, statues, emblems, and paintings. Kemal chose to use nationalism and adopted a Turkish definition that rejected Pan-Islamism. Instead of Pan-Islamism, Kemal’s nationalism concerned itself solely with all the Turkish citizens who lived in the Ottoman core, which would end up becoming the new and modern republic. In Kemalism, the Turkish people had to get used to deep-seated secularism whereby the mosque had to be separated from the state in an uncompromising manner.

The legacy of Kemalism lives on to this day. According to Aybar, this is because the vision of the modern Turkish republic is strongly embedded in it (341). Kemal entrusted the secular elite with the work of dominating banking and industry as well as maintaining a firm grip on the military. For Kemal, the military was the guardian of the state. This secularist-Kemalist model has prevailed in Turkey for decades. All this time, the Islamist-minded Anatolian section of the society has watched helplessly in an environment of being sidelined from the country’s corridors of power.

The role of Islam has remained rather subdued since the end of World War II, a time when the Turkish expansion into Europe was being effectively blocked. This setback triggered a shift towards internal consolidation of power. However, the identity crisis continued as the Anatolian forces struggled to challenge the Istanbul elite’s supremacy. This marked the start of a tumultuous period during which the established powers started looking abroad once again, this time through the Pan-Islamic lens.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the religiously conservative forces have continued to push on with the Islamic vision. The struggle seems to have borne fruits with the coming to power, through the ballot, of the Refah Partisi (RP) or Welfare Party in 1995. This turn of events marked a shift in not only EU’s thinking about Turkey’s membership, but also the country’s role in serving as a buffer between Europe and the Middle East. However, the National Security Council, which is secular-dominated, banned the party within two years. The emergence of a moderate strand of the RP in 2001, known as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has since transformed the fortunes of Turkish Muslims. This turn of events has made Islam continue to be a key factor in the EU accession debate, both domestically and in Europe.

One of the AKP’s main mandates upon assuming power in 2002 was to bridge the economic and political gap between the pro-establishment Kemalist elite and the Anatolian masses. Although AKP is more moderate compared to its predecessor, the RP, it is largely regarded as an affront by secularists. The recent rift between Turkey and the West has been influence greatly by the sentiments expressed by Kemalists, who believe that AKP represents those in Turkey who still embrace the nation’s Islamic past. Such sentiments have continued to pervade the public sphere in spite of spirited efforts by the AKP to exercise caution in exposing its Islamic-oriented political vision, especially during its early days in power. This vision entails supporting and defending Turkic brothers abroad, especially in Europe. Indeed, this has become one of the sources of motivation for the country’s push towards membership in the EU. This vision is inspired by what the ruling party considers a long-neglected Anatolian class.

However, the Islamist vision has not been the preserve of the AKP alone. There is also the Gulen movement, although its stand with regard to the EU accession is not as clear as that of AKP. This movement has been critical in rattling the Kemalist establishment within the last four decades. The aspiration of the followers of this movement has been to replace the Kemalist elite, thereby transforming Turkey into a religiously conservative society. However, the organization presents itself solely as a multi-faith body with the goal of bringing together religious leaders, businessmen, journalists, politicians, and average citizens together. Indeed, the Kemalists have for a long time been cautious enough to perceive the Gulen movement as one of the most critical threats to Turkey’s secular nature. However, on the issue of EU accession, both Islamist groups seem to have a more or less the same viewpoint. Moreover, in the eyes of EU observers, the same prejudices are applicable to all Turkish Islamist groupings and political parties.

Analysis and discussion

Islam no doubt has played a key role in the reluctance by the EU to accept Turkey’s membership over the last half century. As a predominantly Islamic country, Turkey is viewed by the EU against the stereotypical template of Arab countries, thereby bringing into perspective unfounded prejudices. In the wake of the 9/11, these prejudices have been transformed into fears. Many EU countries are worried not just about an Islamic country joining the Europe league, but also the European border being pushed closer to the Middle East region.

Although the prejudices that some EU member states have portrayed against Turkey are unfounded, they touch on the fundamentally critical issue of identity. Europe already has a long-established identity. Turkey, on the other has a rather unique identity that triggers questions about the country’s ‘Europeanness’. Interestingly, both Europe and Turkey have been undergoing internal identity crises of sorts. In Europe, the identity crisis is best exemplified by EU president Herman Van Rompuy, who once commented that Turkey’s accession into the EU would greatly undermine Europe’s Christian values, mainly because it is a predominantly Muslim state.

On the part of Turkey, the internal identity involves a power tussle between Kemalist elites and conservative Islamists. Whereas the Kemalists support a secular state, Islamists long for a time when the Turkish society will turn religiously conservative. Such tussles are a representation of two competing legacies, a phenomenon that is not present in Europe. Such power struggles only increase Turkey’s perceived problematic nature. EU countries often express discomfort with countries with many internal squabbles vouching for accession because of fear that they would add more problems than benefits to the EU. This fear tends to be reinforced by the prejudices that most countries in the West have towards Islamic countries.

On the other hand, there is another dimension in Turkey’s EU membership debate and the role of Islam, that of the views of the Turkish people. The views by the Turkish people on the accession issue are best represented by the positions taken by mainstream political parties and religious groups. However, this is not to say that the option of a referendum on the issue should be ruled out. Regarding the mainstream political parties and religious groups, the general impression is that EU accession is necessary. The Turkish people do not seem bothered by the identity problem in the same way that Europeans are. For the Turkish people, the only key areas of concern are the so-called ‘sensitive issues’ that can easily be ironed out through legislative provisions. The influence of the Islamic roots among the Turkish people cannot be ruled out, although there is no hard-line opposition towards accession in spite of long-standing prejudices by some EU member states.

Conclusion

In summary, Turkey, being an Islamic country, faces peculiar challenges in its aspiration to join the EU. Some EU member states are reluctant to welcome an Islamic country whose current AKP government has strong Islamist roots. Some scholars argue that the prejudices that Europeans have towards Turkey’s accession border on outright religious discrimination. Indeed, from an objective perspective, claims that there is nothing ‘European’ about Turkey may be easily dismissed. However, pragmatically, they touch on the thorny issue of identity. The European identity is founded on Christian values while in Turkey Islam is part of the country’s rich cultural heritage.

Islam seems to play an inhibiting role in efforts by Turkey to accede to the EU. This is largely because of the bad blood that has continued to exist between the West and Islam since the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Meanwhile, the country’s Islamic roots cannot be wished away as they are a part of Turkey’s heritage. Both Turkey and the EU have to get past this perceptual hurdle and address more substantive issues during future accession deliberations. Although the increasingly Islamic Turkish AKP government appears to threaten EU accession, there is a general feeling across the Turkish society that the country stands to benefit a lot by joining the European Union.

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