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Question
| Analyze at the operational level the planning and prosecution of the campaigns waged by the principle participants in the 1991 Gulf War, and identify any relevant lessons for contemporary commanders. |
Answer
Gulf war 1990-1991
Name of Student:
Political Science
January 11, 2015.
Contents
The Political and Military Context of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. 2
Lessons for Contemporary Commanders. 11
Introduction
The Gulf War of 1990-1991 was waged by a US-led coalition against Iraq following the move by the latter to invade Kuwait. During this war, the planning and prosecution of both air and ground campaigns played a critical role in determining the victor. Coalition forces overpowered Iraqi forces mainly because the former had airpower advantage while the latter lacked strategy.[1] The Coalition’s airpower advantage came about because of numerous contributions from US allies, including Germany, Canada, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and France. To produce an effective war plan, many participants in the US administration, including President H.W. Bush, his foreign secretary, and top military commanders had to get involved. This made the whole process complex, arduous, and highly contentious. Inevitably, different courses of action were suggested before the Coalition decided to wage the campaign in the manner that it did.
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The aim of this paper is to analyze aspects of planning and prosecution of the 1990-1991 Gulf War at the operational level. It examines what the Coalition planned to do, what it actually did during the war, the strengths and weaknesses of its planning and prosecution, consequences, and possible explanations. The objective is to bring together loose ends in the debate on whether the war was won because of Coalition’s strengths, Iraqi forces’ weaknesses, or both. The paper also explores any other factors may have been responsible for Coalition’s decisive win against Iraq forces. Based on this analysis, lessons for contemporary commanders are derived.
The Political and Military Context of the 1990-1991 Gulf War
The Gulf War was militarily rewarding for Coalition forces. They were able to emerge victorious with a loss rate that was historically low; it only took six weeks for 795,000 Coalition forces to destroy the Iraq army, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and losing only 240 troops.[2] Before the war began, many people predicted that Coalition forces would suffer huge losses in a protracted conflict. Thus, it was surprising that a decisive victory against the Iraqi forces was achieved in a relatively short time.
The policy consequences of this historical win were significant for both the United States and Iraq. For the US, the Gulf War was an important event through which the country could shape its defense planning during the 1990s. The war would shape America’s defense planning in just the same way that the defeat in Vietnam shaped it during the 1980s. Henceforth, US forces would be sized against the yardstick established during the Gulf War.
Today, 1991 Gulf War acts as an important benchmark for the US military, particularly in determining the acceptability of casualty levels in war. It is on this basis that new doctrines, weapons, and strategies are being developed. Before 1991, it was widely expected that future land wars would involve missile and air forces playing a supporting role by reducing the ability by the adversary to make advances into crucial positions using tanks. This traditional conception of war is quickly disappearing. Armored breakthroughs are being replaced with information supremacy.
New sources of information played a critical role in the win by Coalition forces in the Gulf War. One of these sources of information was the Gulf War Air Power Survey, which was heavily relied on by the US Air Force. This platform was modelled on the Strategic Bombing Survey of the post-World War II era. Thus, it was widely expected that the US military would use it. The other important source of information for the Air Force during the war was the 73 Basting Project. The purpose of this project was to provide a database of comprehensive details on the conduct of battles and then to use computer simulation technology for virtual re-creation of data to provide a minute-by-minute sequence of activities of all participating armored vehicles, tanks, trucks, and infantry teams. To compensate for the weakness of the simulation method, the US Air Force combined it with other methods, including historical analysis, deductive argument, and simulation experimentation.
Planning for the War
An ideal way to look at the planning phase of the 1990-1991 Gulf war is to examine the military strategies adopted by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein on the one hand and the US-led Coalition on the other. In the Kuwait Theater, Saddam’s military operated in three phases. The first phase was the country’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The second one was the period of deterrence between September 1990 and January 1991. The third phase was the defensive period from January to February 1991, at which time the Operation Desert Storm unfolded.
The Iraq military met little resistance during its invasion of Kuwait. The operation was relatively complex in terms of the combination of weapons used. The Iraqi military used ground, air, and sea forces to operate on multiple axes both during the day and at night. It is not clear whether Iraq’s ultimate intention was to extend its conquest to Saudi Arabia. Even if Iraq did not intend to attack Saudi Arabia, its mere positioning in Kuwait intimidated Saudi Arabia. The occupation of Kuwait ushered in a long phase of deterrence. Iraq established a theater defense with a view to deter ground operations by Coalition forces by threatening to attack them with high casualties.[3]
It is improbable that Iraq was convinced of its readiness to achieve a military victory over the US-led Coalition. Thus, Saddam hoped to create a situation in which securing a negotiated settlement was the most plausible political move by the Coalition. This view was based on Saddam’s opinion that a high loss rate for the US would trigger a strong anti-war movement similar to the one the emerged in the country during the Vietnam War. To Saddam, most people in the American society would be opposed to the idea of sacrificing many American soldiers on the warfront for the sake of Kuwait. Against this backdrop, Iraqi military strategists were convinced that a strategy of deterrence with a potential for heavy casualties for the Coalition would create a stalemate, thereby forcing a negotiated settlement. During the deterrence period, theatre defenses were gradually increased. Emphasis was on the psychological effect of proportionately heightened fears of the country’s determination to inflict high casualties through terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and actual combat operations.
The third phase started in earnest by way of defense against the offensive staged by the Coalition. This phase ushered in the most undesirable situation for Iraq. At this point, it emerged that Saddam’s strategy of deterrence had failed. The Coalition had done what had seemed inconceivable for Saddam Hussein: launching a large-scale offensive campaign in the Gulf. In light of this development, Iraq’s military strategy was simplistic. It involved surviving the air campaign with minimal destruction to military capabilities, drawing Israel into the conflict in order to create a split within the coalition, inflicting heavy casualties to trigger a stalemate on the battleground, and forcing the coalition to come to the negotiation table. Saddam envisioned a situation where he could claim victory even after withdrawing from Kuwait as part of the negotiated settlement. This would enable him to not only maintain power within Iraq but also achieve his overarching objective of rising to the position of leadership in the Arab world.
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Saddam’s military strategy of deterrence was anchored on the operations of the army in the Kuwait Theater. Although Iraq had a strong, well-equipped air force, it was never put in use to present any serious challenge to the air power of the Coalition. Iraq only deployed a few F1 Mirage aircraft towards the end of the conflict, at which time it was too late in the day to bring about any meaningful change to the course of the war. As the Coalition campaign neared completion, the Iraq air force’s primary objective was survival.
On the part of the US-led Coalition, the big-pictures choices of President George H.W. Bush and his team of political and military advisors were of utmost importance in determining the choice of military strategy for the campaign.[4] President Bush was able to expand options available to him by focusing on both the reversal of the Kuwait occupation and deterrence of an attack on Saudi Arabia. Similarly, organizational dynamics of the US military played a critical role in the preparation for war. It is on this basis that Coalition forces made decisions on which places to target, whether or not to use an amphibious assault and the choice of weapons during different phases of the conflict. These organizational dynamics created an environment where the Coalition fought a war of maneuver, thus exhibiting tactical superiority over Iraqi forces’ war of encounter.
A potential weak point for the US-led Coalition forces was their lack of basic equipment like minesweepers and adequate naval and air transport. Moreover, officers from the US air force downplayed the importance of offering close air support to ground forces. On the part of the US, this phenomenon may be explained by the state of bureaucratic parochialism, which manifested itself profoundly in Bush administration soon before the start of the war. However, as the conflict situation rapidly transitioned into a crisis, this bureaucratic parochialism dramatically decreased.[5] It is against this backdrop that President Bush, the Secretary of Defense, and top military commanders made critical individual decisions that greatly influenced the course of the war.
The US military chose its weapons and roles in a manner that optimized the use of its superior organizational culture as opposed to the maximization of budgets. A case in point was the country’s decision to employ large numbers of forces, which was a significant factor in the war. During the decision to send the first deployment of Coalition forces, Richard Cheney, the then US Secretary of Defense, proposed two objectives: compelling Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and taking military action with a view to overthrow Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration endorsed the decision to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait but receded on the proposal to overthrow Saddam Hussein.
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), suggested that Saudi Arabia needed to be pressured into accepting the deployment of US ground forces for purposes of maintaining defense. Powell was skeptical of the idea that the US military could use long-range air power to provide defense against an impending Iraqi offensive against Saudi in the absence of heavy ground forces.
Like Colin Powell, many top administrators in the Bush administration held the view that bringing ground forces in the conflict early on was an excellent way through which the US could signal its commitment to Saudi Arabia. However, when President Bush rose to speak to the public, he reiterated his stance, which involved the use of more aggressive options, for example the outright rejection of anything less than complete withdrawal of Iraq forces from Kuwait. This way, the president seemed to have used the opportunity provided by the Gulf war to demonstrate the importance of presidential powers in dealing with crises. The initial deployment decision was considered a crisis situation in which every decision that the president made was very important.
Colin Powell supported an all-or-nothing approach in which the deployment of US military would be based on three criteria.[6] The first criterion was the existence of clearly defined objectives relating to the defense of national interests. The second criterion was that the military needed to be used in a manner that overwhelmed the adversary particularly through ground power. The third criterion was that the goals ought to be widely supported by the public. In some ways, Colin Powel’s criteria may be likened to the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, which had been proposed by Caspar Weinberger, a former Secretary of Defense.[7] The decision to adopt the so-called “Powell Doctrine” was acceptable considering that the US was keen not to repeat the mistakes it made during the Vietnam War. Such an approach would also enable the US to overwhelm the adversary in a manner that led to minimal loss of human life and swift termination of the war.
The decision to send the second deployment of troops to the Gulf war was made in October 1990. At this time, the need to clarify the mission in the Middle East was also being expressed in US policymaking circles. Despite lengthy negotiations, President Bush gave his top commanders instructions to prepare for possible offensive plans on short notice. This led to the creation of a four-phase plan that would begin with air attacks on Iraqi air forces and command-and-control centers, followed by transport facilities and supplies departments. The next target in air attack would be Iraqi ground forces. Finally, an amphibious assault would be conducted to target Iraqi forces stationed in Kuwait.
Prosecution of the War
Coalition forces made the right decision to cripple the air defense system of Iraq as well as crucial components of the country’s control and command system during the first move: the intensive six-week air campaign. While this was happening, the Coalition ground forces were making a strategic move through secret redeployments. Two days after the redeployment, Coalition ground forces had reached Kuwait City. It is after this first move that the Coalition forces faced the strongest resistance of the campaign, waged by the Republican Guard. The next major victory came during the Battle of Medina Ridge, where it took only 40 minutes for the US brigade to annihilate key Iraqi positions and to take 55 Iraqi soldiers prisoner. Similar victories were reported at Objective Norfolk and Wadi Al Batin. By the third day since the deployment of Coalition ground forces, some 1350 Iraqi tanks, 285 artillery pieces, 1229 trucks, 105 air defense platforms, and 1224 troop carriers had been destroyed.[8]
Several explanations for the decisive Coalition victory have been provided. Similarly, some of the attention has been on the extent to which the planning and prosecution of the war on the part of Iraqi forces contributed to their crushing defeat. Nevertheless, the orthodox approach has tended to focus on the strengths exhibited by Coalition forces. For instance, its technology was undoubtedly superior to that of Iraqi forces. The use of new surveillance, precision guidance, and stealth systems meant that Coalition aircraft had taken full command of the Iraqi skies. At the same time, it rendered the Iraqi ground forces helpless in the face of the massive destruction meted out against the country’s air defense systems.
During the first six weeks, Coalition forces were able to destroy Iraqi equipment without subjecting themselves to close ground combat. This approach also proved to be an effective way of killing the morale of Iraqi ground forces.[9] However, there is no consensus on what the most important factor that led to the decisive Coalition victory really was. One common explanation emphasizes the advanced technology that Coalition forces used in ground combat operations, which ostensibly enabled them to strike their targets with virtual immunity and away from the striking range of out-armored Iraqi forces. Another common explanation is that Coalition’s maneuver warfare was more effective than Iraqi forces’ encounter warfare. This creates the impression that the Coalition’s communications and navigation technologies enabled them to outmaneuver Iraqis, thereby ejecting them from Kuwait City without embarking on a frontal assault.
Some critics focus more on shortcomings of Iraqi forces, for example the obvious lack of strategy on the part of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, to explain the one-sided nature of the 1990-1991 Gulf War.[10] One argument that belongs to this school of thought is that low Coalition losses were reported because the Iraqi army simply failed to fight back.[11] The same case applies to the view that Iraqi forces were outnumbered and that they lacked military competence. These arguments create a strong impression that there was a major military anomaly on the part of Iraq.
It may not be entirely true to say that the air technology that Coalition forces employed at the beginning of the war caused massive destruction to a point where the number of Iraqi weapons was unprecedentedly low by the time Coalition ground forces arrived. This is because a very large Iraqi armor force managed to survive the air campaign. This force could still have easily inflicted heavy casualties against Coalition forces, potentially laying the groundwork for a protracted war. By February 24, about 2100 Iraqi armored vehicles and 2000 tanks had survived the six-week campaign, and could potentially have been deployed to pose resistance to the ground assault by Coalition forces. Similarly, variability in equipment attrition gave Iraqi forces opportunities to reorganize and redeploy in readiness to offer resistance.
Lessons for Contemporary Commanders
The 1990-1991 Gulf War provides numerous lessons for contemporary commanders on how to prepare for and prosecute war in the post-modern era of technological sophistication and growing interdependence among states. The Gulf War of 1990-1991 demonstrated how technological sophistication can be used to improve war outcomes through rapid deployment, quick prosecution of war, and a rapid reduction in war casualties. Moreover, by the time the war was nearing the end, it became obvious that the wars of the future would inadvertently attract the participation of a coalition of forces based on the side of conflict that different sovereign states would decide to support. In this war, the international community was opposed to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, hence the decision by the UN Security Council to impose a deadline for the country’s withdrawal from Kuwait as well as the formation of a US-led coalition in readiness for a campaign against Iraqi occupation army.
The lessons to be learned by commanders of today have to do with policies, strategies, and tactics of war. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein played a major role in the Gulf War. His appraisal of US intentions was flawed, and this greatly contributed to his country’s humiliating defeat. Saddam’s belief that the US would be hesitant to send troops to a foreign territory reflected his dogmatic approach to the American military strategy. He held this view based on his appraisal of the horrifying defeat that the US suffered in the Vietnam War and the consequences it had on the country’s future military engagements on foreign territory. The Vietnam War triggered a strong anti-war movement in the United States. In the build-up to the 1990 Gulf War, Saddam argued that the Bush administration would avoid going to war for fear of political backlash at home. This misreading of America’s intentions in the Gulf proved to be a costly mistake for Iraq. As a commander-in-chief of the Iraqi forces with considerable experience from the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein should have done better in his assessment of the enemy.
Iraqi commanders also erred by relying too much on deterrence and encounter as a determinant of the war outcome. In active combat, deterrence, as opposed to maneuver, pursues a preeminently negative aim, that of dissuading adversaries from taking action that he may take, or one that he may not have the intention to take in the first place. Thus, one can only measure the success of deterrence in negative terms. For instance, Iraqi commanders considered each day in which the Coalition did not launch an attack a victory. This essentially means that they had left the initiative with Coalition forces as far as progress of the war was concerned. Thus, there is an element of truth in some analysts’ assertion that Coalition forces presented war to the Iraq military during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, but the Iraqi forces simply failed to show up.[12]
Deterrence as a military strategy is particularly unsuitable for a large, overconfident army facing a well-prepared, technologically endowed force relying predominantly on maneuver-related tactics. This phenomenon unfolded in the Gulf War, leading to a massive dent in the morale of Iraqi forces. Saddam Hussein maintained a centralized system of command and control in the military, meaning that commanders had no one to take orders from once Coalition warplanes destroyed the Iraqi military communication system. The lesson to be learned here is that too much control over commanders through micromanagement can limit functionality in case communication infrastructure collapses. Military communication within the rank and file of the Iraqi forces grinded to a halt following the destruction of Iraqi’s highly centralized command and control system. Decentralization of military command-and-control and the embedment of redundancy systems within existing communication infrastructure should be promoted to create alternative ways of exchanging information during air and ground combat operations.
An invaluable lesson for US military commanders was that it is very easy to run over an adversary that lacks effective strategy, planning, defenses, tactics, morale, and leadership.[13] On the other hand, contemporary commanders will no doubt be interested in examining how differently US military strategists operated compared to their predecessors during the Vietnam War. For example, in the Gulf War, unlike Vietnam, US military commanders were allowed to operate in a relatively autonomous manner by fighting in the best way they knew how. This phenomenon unfolded through a rapid decrease in the level of bureaucratic parochialism, whereby top military officially were increasingly being allowed to make critical individual decisions that greatly influenced the course of the war.
Conclusion
The planning and prosecution of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 provided important insights for the planning and prosecution of a military campaign in the post-modern era of technological sophistication and increased interdependence among states. The United States succeeded in mobilizing support for the campaign from many of its allies around the world in a relatively short time. On the other hand, poor planning and lack of a clear strategy on the part of Iran greatly contributed to the Iraqi military’s humiliating defeat. Most importantly, the war provides crucial lessons for contemporary commanders in terms of planning and conducting war in the present era.
The combined effect of Iraqi forces’ weaknesses and Coalition’s strengths greatly led to the outcome of the war. This fact remains unchanged even in the context of changing perspectives on the war based on new information as well as political realities. Coalition forces won not just because they deployed technologically superior weapons but also because of poor planning and lack of proper strategy on the part of Iraqi’s Saddam Hussein. Saddam’s misreading of the real intentions of the US influenced his decisions, leading him to take actions that significantly diminished chances of success for Iraqi forces.
The political and military context of the war also sheds on light on various courses of action that both sides should have taken to end up with better political and military outcomes. However, most blame tends to be directed towards Iraq because of its position as the country that was on the losing side. The lessons to be learned in relation to the planning and prosecution of this war are important for all commanders involved in military affairs in any society today. For instance, the strategy of deterrence is unsuitable for a strategically weak military unit because such a unit ends up playing in the hands of the adversary; in active combat, deterrence pursues a preeminently negative aim, that of dissuading the adversary from taking action that he may take, or one that he may not have the intention to take in the first place. In conclusion, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 demonstrated how technological sophistication can be used to improve war outcomes through rapid deployment, quick prosecution of war, and a rapid reduction in war casualties.
References
Biddle, Stephen. “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict.” International Security, 21, no. 2 (1996): 139-179.
Cigar, Norman. “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War: Blueprint for Defeat.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 15, no. 1 (1992): 1-29.
Dubois, Thomas. The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait.” Parameters, 3, no. 5 (1991): 24-38.
Halliday, Fred. “The Gulf War 1990-1991 and the study of international relations.” Review of International Studies 20, (1994): 109-130.
Inman, Bobby., ]oseph S. Nye, William J. Perry and Roger K. Smith. “Lessons from the Gulf War.” The Washington Quarterly, 3, no. 1 (1992): 57-74.
Karsh, Efraim. “Reflections on the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 3 (1996): 303-320.
Monten, Jonathan, and Andrew Bennett. “Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990–91 Gulf War.” Security Studies 19 (2010): 486–520.
O’Neill, Bard, and Ilana Kass. “The Persian Gulf War: A political‐military assessment.” Comparative Strategy, 11, no. 2, (1992): 213-240.
Perry, William. “Desert Storm and Deterrence.” Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 4 (1991): 66-82.
Record, Jeffrey. “Defeating desert storm (and why Saddam didn’t).” Comparative Strategy, 12, no. 2 (1993): 125-140.
[1] Jeffrey Record, “Defeating desert storm (and why Saddam didn’t).” Comparative Strategy, 12, no. 2 (1993): 128.
[2] Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” International Security, 21, no. 2 (1996): 142.
[3] William Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence.” Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 4 (1991): 66-82.
[4] Jonathan, Monten and Andrew Bennett, “Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990–91 Gulf War,” Security Studies 19 (2010): 489.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid, 503
[7]Thomas Dubois, “The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait,” Parameters, 3, no. 5 (1991): 24.
[8] Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” International Security, 21, no. 2 (1996): 147.
[9] Bard O’Neill and Ilana Kass, “The Persian Gulf War: A political‐military assessment,” Comparative Strategy, 11, no. 2, (1992): 224.
[10] Efraim Karsh, “Reflections on the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 3 (1996): 313.
[11] Norman Cigar, “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War: Blueprint for Defeat.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 15, no. 1 (1992): 20.
[12] Bobby Inman, Joseph S. Nye, William J. Perry and Roger K. Smith. “Lessons from the Gulf War.” The Washington Quarterly, 3, no. 1 (1992): 59.
[13] Halliday, Fred. “The Gulf War 1990-1991 and the study of international relations.” Review of International Studies 20, (1994): 109-130.
