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Question
Please create a 5-page study guide detailing the important points in: “EU and Russia Relations After Crimea: Red Lines for “Business as Usual”, Eastern Europe Studies Centre, June 2014, http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/news/id750/EU%20and%20Russia%20after%20Crimea.pdf
Answer
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) enforced in 1997, is the legal basis for the contemporary relations between Russia and the EU. The partnership covers trade, investment and economic policies. The ten-year agreement has since expired in 2007 and is yet to be replaced by a new agreement. This analysis will focus on the ongoing interactions between the EU and Russia particularly as the two political actors continue to negotiate a new position in regards to policies in Eurasia (Trenin, 2014). Ukraine will be a key component as it sits at the center of ongoing politics between the two units. Amidst these ongoing negotiations, there exists a huge gap in ideological differences and political structure. In particular, Russia’s evolution in in the post-Soviet has resulted in a completely different orientation and view of Europe. Russia now emerges as a competitor that matches the EU instead of a participant wishing to join the EU. To accomplish this,the country intends to establish a bloc with its neighbors, obtain arbiter power and go into an EU policy negotiation with equaling power.
Geopolitical competitionsbetween Russia and Europe have prompted the different approaches in these negotiations. In order to demonstrate its rise and competing-power status, Russia did not participate in the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). To substitute for this, Russia and EU created four common spaces: a common space of freedom, a space for economic advancement, a platform for security and justice and a space for cooperation in external security, research and education.In a bid to promote better relations between the two units, the negotiation focused a lot on the issuance of a visa free travel. The willingness to implement such regulations shows a difference and growth from the Soviet Union (Trenin, 2014). While this continues to face difficulties over third world immigration concerns, the impact seems to be potentially minimal. In addition, a cooperative union between the two entities only serves to create political and economic benefits that will surpass the potential difficulties.
Currently, Ukraine is at the center of these negotiations. Conflict between Russia and Uraine has continued to develop and worsen in recent years. Upon dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, these founding countries were established as separate entities. In 2013, concern over Ukraine’s economic integration put the EU against Russia (Trenin, 2014). The EU understands the need to invite Ukraine into the Eurasian bloc and consistently facilitated negotiations in service of this mission. However, the Ukrainian government suspended these negotiations and resulted in even more protests by European officials on the ground. After these Euromidian protests and the fall of the Ukrainian president, Russia made military incursions into Ukraine in 201and set up several stations. The territory of Crimea was the main base and point of infrastructure control during the Crimea annexation (Laurinavičius, Kaciunas, Kersanskas, and Kojal, 2014). This followed a referendum that was simultaneously disputed in which Crimeans voted to join Russia. The result of this conflict has included an armed battle between the Ukrainian military and Russian forces.
The Russian military has notably used severe intimidation strategies in this conflict in a move that has caused international concern. As reported by Ukraine, many international organizations and stakeholders believe that Russia has gone against numerous international regulations and agreements. With military intelligence officers operating in Ukraine, many countries placed trading sanctions against Russia in a bid to get them to step down. Even though the Crimea referendum was widely disputed and rejected, the Russian president insisted that this would remain a Russian administered territory and an eventual military base would be set up. Growing concerns have risen on NATO’S suggestion that Russia was deploying nuclear weapons to Crimea. Notably, the Russian president does not deny but states that specific advanced technology had indeed been deployed (Laurinavičius, Kaciunas, Kersanskas, and Kojal, 2014).
The year 2016 markeda new turn in the form of renewed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Border crossing and movement was completely cut off. With Russia accusing Ukraine of turning to acts of terrorism, the US government rejected these claims in its own capacity of observation. The Ukrainian president continues to warn that Russia is planning for a long-term invasion and sites that the EU is reluctant or even unable to stop this process. This conflict has severely affected the relations between Russia and the EU. Furthermore, each of these units is in an obvious bid to forge an alignment with Ukraine (Laurinavičius, Kaciunas, Kersanskas, and Kojal, 2014). Dialogue between the EU and Russia has been targeted mainly at the application of international strategies to influence Ukraine’s position and decision in regards to creating a common Eurasian policy.
Responses to this conflict have also offset other reactions that equally affect the process of negotiation. Originally set up to deal with the Soviet Union,the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has renewed its activities as a way of responding to this conflict. Controlled by a combination of European and North American governments, Russia rejects its intervention and describes it as extremely biased towards European agendas. In this same year, more European countries have come out to condemn Russia in what is described as an abuse of Ukrainian sovereignty.
Because of the simmering conflict, the Russian stock market fell by 10 percent against the Euro and US dollar (Laurinavičius, Kaciunas, Kersanskas, and Kojal, 2014). Global financial markets have been affected since 2014 with immediate trade countries such as Germany deteriorating (Laurinavičius, Kaciunas, Kersanskas, and Kojal, 2014). In 2017, Ukraine opened a case against Russia, accusing it of facilitating military terrorism.Neighboring territories such as Moldova and Georgia that carry long-term conflicts dating back to the Soviet Union will also play an active role in any further EU strategies and negotiations with Russia. In Ukraine as is common in most countries, the elites and general population are crucial to any further negotiations and construction of a Eurasian bloc. The EU must understand that it cannot bring Ukraine into this commitment until the elite agree and identify the advantages of this strategy.
To a fault, the EU has attempted to force a clear and financial alignment of Ukraine in regards to this negotiation. Equally, Russia has attempted to forcefully integrate Ukraine into a separate Eurasian entity that can then go into these negotiations as an independent unit that competes with Europe on the same level and capability. Yet, there continues to be great ideological differences between Russia and Europe that threaten this cooperation beyond the Ukraine conflict.
As Europe becomes more open-minded and less conservative, Russia has condemned this high level of secularism and instead continues to support the old European beliefs and cultures. Some of the most Russian rejected issues include gay rights and high levels of multiculturalism that Russia believes have negated the religious establishment and sustainability of Europe. Interestingly, this difference represents long-term constraints between Russia and Western Europe in particular. While Eastern Europe has remained mostly traditional and religious alongside Russia, Western Europe widely influences the EU and its policies for all member countries (Laurinavičius, Kaciunas, Kersanskas, and Kojal, 2014). Following the Ukraine conflict, the biggest and most present debate continues to be how the EU will approach its relations to Russia.
In what is commonly referred to as ‘business as usual’, majority of the Western European countries have chosen to implement this strategy in the conflict. Even so, other countries such as Poland have held strong opinions on the need to keep constant pressure on Russia and prevent it from placing more expansive strategies in its region. Other countries such as Italy, Spain, France and Greece have sought to facilitate negotiations as they suffered financially during this period (Laurinavičius, Kaciunas, Kersanskas, and Kojal, 2014). With tied industries between these countries and Russia in the energy sector, Germany and France specifically act as mediators in order to restore this financial balance and sustainability in trade.
The business as usual approach has it immediate consequences of normalizing economic relations, lifting sanctions and recognition of Russia as a veto holder in the security exchange space. Either the containment or engagement policies have been suggested for this situation (Trenin, 2014). The containment policy acknowledges the separation between political and economic structures of all the countries. EU membership must be offered to all the countries in order to promote positive integration. The engagement policy focuses on Russian coexistence and recognition of Russia’s interest according to their post-soviet structures and ideas.
In order to establish freedom of operation, the US and Europe must first eliminate all forms of energy and gas dependence on Russia. NATO cooperation and membership must be allowed for all the countries, and theprocess of negotiation must be well-structured(Trenin, 2014). It is important that both Europe and Russia do not forcefully push Ukraine into any decision. The country has to establish its position internally before it can communicate decisions regarding this conflict.
References
Laurinavičius, M. Kaciunas,L., Kersanskas, V. and Kojala L. (June, 2014). EU and Russia Relations after Crimea: Red Lines for “Business as Usual. Eastern Europe Studies Center.
Trenin, D. (2014). A Practical Approach to EU-Russian Relations. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.
